For the last seven seasons, UNLV men’s basketball has existed in a constant state of motion.

Head coaches have changed. Offensive systems have been rebranded. Recruiting pitches have evolved. The transfer portal has been fully embraced. NIL has entered the picture. The faces, the buzzwords, and the offseason optimism all look different.

And yet, when the season plays out, the ending keeps feeling eerily familiar.

Middle-of-the-pack Mountain West finishes. An offense that struggles to impose its will. Close games against peers that slip away late. Little postseason traction. Different eras, different rosters, but the same emotional beats.

At some point, fans are justified in asking: how many times can this be coincidence?

This isn’t about effort. It’s not about caring. And it’s not about pinning blame on one coach, one staff, or one player. This is about structure. Because when you keep feeding the same inputs into a program, you shouldn’t be surprised when the outputs don’t change.

When Change Produces the Same Result

Since 2019, UNLV has looked like a program constantly reinventing itself. But underneath the surface, one thing has stayed remarkably consistent: the way the roster is built.

Across multiple coaching tenures, UNLV has repeatedly assembled the same profile:

  • Scoring guards who need the ball to be effective
  • Combo wings asked to initiate offense
  • Limited true organization at the point of attack

If systems were truly changing in a meaningful way, the numbers would eventually reflect it. Instead, UNLV’s statistical footprint has stayed locked in place year after year.

Different schemes. Same shape.

The Roster Pattern, Season by Season

From 2019-20 through the present, UNLV has rarely built around a true offensive organizer; the kind of primary point guard who controls tempo, creates advantages, and makes the game easier for everyone else on the floor.

Yes, point guards have existed on the roster. But time and again, ball-handling responsibility has drifted away from them and into the hands of scorers and wings, sometimes by design, sometimes by necessity.

Even when a near-solution emerged, Dedan Thomas Jr., the role never fully aligned with traditional point-guard function. He was asked to score first, carry usage, and create late-clock offense without consistent spacing, shooting gravity, or secondary creation around him. That’s not orchestration. That’s survival.

Fast-forward to the current season. With Myles Che, the lone true organizer, sidelined by injury, UNLV has once again defaulted to committee ball-handling.

Seven seasons. One recurring roster shape.

The Numbers Don’t Lie

Roster construction always shows up in ball movement. Always.

Team Assists, Turnovers, and Assist-to-Turnover Ratio
SeasonGamesAssistsTurnoversAST/TO
2019–20324044270.95
2020–21273563371.06
2021–22324423581.23
2022–23324113941.04
2023–24344503761.20
2024–25333983521.13
2025–26*212972631.13

*2025–26 reflects games played to date.

There are moments of progress… usually when something resembling an organizer is present. But those gains never stick. They fade once lineup balance, spacing issues, and role overload creep back in.

That’s not randomness. That’s a pattern that never corrects itself.

Assists per Game vs. Turnovers per Game

SeasonAST/GTO/G
2019–2012.613.3
2020–2113.212.5
2021–2213.811.2
2022–2312.812.3
2023–2413.211.1
2024–2512.110.7
2025–26*14.112.5

The current season doesn’t disprove the trend; it reinforces it. Yes, assists are up. But so are turnovers. That’s not control. That’s reactive passing. It’s movement born out of pressure, not structure.

Assist Rate (Assists per Field Goal Made)
SeasonA/FGM
2019–2052.0%
2020–2152.3%
2021–2249.6%
2022–2349.4%
2023–2448.1%
2024–2549.6%
2025–26*52.3%

Year after year, UNLV sits below the Division I median in assisted scoring. That’s not an accident. That’s what happens when an offense relies on self-creation instead of advantage creation.

And advantage creation almost always starts with structure at the point of attack.

The Point Guard Variable

This cycle keeps repeating.

Assist rates bump up when a “point guard” is present. Then reality sets in. Usage overload. Limited spacing. No secondary creators. The offense bends back toward isolation and improvisation because it has no other choice.

That story has played out across multiple staffs, multiple recruiting classes, and multiple eras.

Carbon Copies, Not Coincidences

Across seven seasons, UNLV has consistently rostered:

  • High-usage scoring guards
  • Combo wings forced into initiation roles
  • Interior players who don’t facilitate offense
  • Little year-to-year continuity

The jerseys change. The names change. The distribution does not.

So the outcomes don’t either.

A Structural, Not Tactical, Issue

This is the hardest truth for fans, and maybe the most important.

In modern college basketball, winning programs don’t rely solely on coaching changes to fix structural problems. They separate tactics from roster architecture. They treat roster balance, role definition, and continuity as organizational responsibilities, not just coaching preferences.

If UNLV’s issues were purely schematic, they would have shown meaningful variation by now. Instead, the same limitations keep resurfacing under different leadership.

That points upward, not sideways.

The Bottom Line

For seven seasons, UNLV men’s basketball has experienced structural continuity disguised as change.

The roster shape stays the same. The ball-handling burden stays the same. The assist profile stays the same. And so do the results.

The absence, or persistent misalignment, of a true primary organizer isn’t a talking point. It’s a measurable reality with predictable consequences.

Fans aren’t asking for miracles. They’re asking for evolution that actually reaches the foundation.

Until that foundation changes, it’s hard to believe the ending will.

2 responses to “Same Roster, Same Result: Why UNLV Basketball Keeps Running in Place”

  1. Sue c henning Avatar
    Sue c henning

    Need foundational change. If possible keep Dra, Che, and Jones at all cost and build from there. Need tough, hungry, and most importantly smart players. Get a coach that can coach, great x and o, in game management, and can convince players of his proven ways. Shertz (St Louis) and Turner (UCI) comes to mind. With a great coach and core leaders on the court rebels can start winning and building next season.

  2. William M. Klein Jr. Avatar
    William M. Klein Jr.

    The entire article is interesting but emphasizes the wrong thing. It’s not offense that wins – it’s defense. Last night at Reno we played a team that average 43% FG percentage and 38% Three point percentage. Against us they were 58% and 57%. Hold them to their average and we win going away. The 76 points we scored were enough for U.C. Davis, Washington, SDSU, Utah State and New Mexico to beat them. Because those teams play DEFENSE.

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